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The preient paper discusses some inter-relations of logic, dialectics,
and politics. It is largely limited to American and West European litera-
tures on these topics, because I do not pretend to have mastered other rele-
vant literatures and languages. More specifically, it reviews and synthe-
sizes two recently interrelated scholarly controversies, the "paradigms"
debate occasioned by Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(Kuhn, 1962 and 1970) and the somewhat misnamed Positivism Controversy
in [West] German sociology CAdey and Frisby Geds.), 1976),-' The currency
of such discussions (centered on the issue of scientific knowledge cumu-
lation) is evident in 4everal other works, perhaps most notably by Radnitzky,
Bernstein and Giddens.
My review will pay special concern to the role of formal logic in various
social scientific philosophies, as well as the intermediate philosophical
positions now visible somehow between classical "logical positivism" and
Marxist-Leninist "dialectics," namely Popper-Lakatos' critical rationalism,
the "revolutionary hermeneutics" and "methodological anarchism" implied by
Kuhn and Feyerabend, and the "dialectical hermeneutics" of Habermas, Apel
and other contemporaries of the Frankfurt school. My hypothesis is that
the issues raised are sufficiently fundamental to be visible among scholars
of other persuasions as well, including Marxist-Leninism. They thus may provide
an area of potentially useful scholarly exchange across international political
alignments.
Because Bernstein, after Adorno and Habermas, criticizes "mainstream" empirical
social scientists like Merton and Smelser for mistakenly viewing "the history of
their own disciplines through the spectacles of positivism," (1976, p5), we shall
begin with a brief review of the main concerns of 19th century positivistic epis-
temological philosophy and its 20th century descendants, logical positivism and
logical empiricism.
I. From Positivistic Philosophy to Logical Empiricism
Giddens (1976, p. 130) argues that "positivism" in nineteenth century social
theory and philosophy meant:
1) (the principle of positive, nonmetaphysical knowledge) "a conviction that
all is to count as 'knowledge' ... is capable of being expressed in terms which
refer in an immediate way to some reality, or aspects of reality, that can be
apprehended through the senses";
2) (social science naturalism) "a faith that the methods and logical structure
of science, as epitomized in classical physics, can be applied to the study of
social phenomena."
The broad outlines of an optimistic program of rational social transformation
were clear. "Compte and Marx wrote in the shadow of the triumphs of natural
science, and botla regarded the extension of science to the study of human conduct
a
in society as a direct outcome of the progressive march of human understanding
towards man himself." (Ciddens, p12) Reactionary mystifications, idealistic
(Hegelian) metaphysics and religious mysteries could be overcome as enlightened
man moved from the science of nature toward scientific self-understanding and
subsequent technical mastery over the conditions of his own social existence.
Hence,
3) "Scientific cognition must be technicalIy utilizable," i.e. in unified,
rational form so as to be useful for controlling nature and society. At
least the Comptean version argued as well that
4) as a result of its scientific origins, "our knowledge is, in principle,
unfinished and relative." (Habermas, 1971, pp74-77, italics added),
Twentieth century logical positivism or logical empiricism revised and
elaborated upon these themes. According to Radnitzky, whom I now quote repeatedly,
key programmatic ideals within logical empiricism were:
l') (the unified science princiLl:e) "All scientific disciplines should form
part of one basic discipline." Principle 2 above suggests including here the
notion that the basic methodology of these disciplines should be the same. Also,
it suggests:
2') (physicalism) "Among the scientific disciplines now in existence physics
approximates the ideal best".
3') (reductionism to an ideal logical language) "Other disciplines may be
reduced to physics by making a language that has been designed for an idealized
physical science the common language of all "science-like" disciplines, and by
making physical concepts the fundamental concepts of the ideal unified science".
Post-Russellian mathematical logic or meta-mathematics is thus seen as the ideal
of "metascience" or scientific self-understanding, hence 4')-6'):
4') (The ideal of hypothetical-deductive knowledge systems) "an ideal physics
is conceived as a mathematical theory fitted out with semantic rules, which give
it empirical content." (Radnitzky, 1970, pxvi).
The universally valid laws of such systems have been usually, but not always
interpreted causally.
5') (The princile ofempiricism) For its empirical content, "[Elvery
primitive term [of a basic vocabulary] must refer to something in 'experience'
and every non-primitive term must be introduced in terms of primitive terms by
definitional chains [of logical equivalencel." "Experience" here is understood to
be either a) of the direct, "positive," phenomenal, observable variety or
b) perceptual, i.e. intersubjectively "verifiable" in a scientific way.
(Radnitzky, 1970, I, p2 8)
6') (The principle of extensionality) Formally, i.e. grammatically, the ideal
logical language should be extensional, i.e. involving truth-functional relation-
ships logically built up from ultimately nonextensional primitive propositions. 5
Whitehead and Rutsell's extensionalist logical system in Principia Mathematics,
with its aversion to substantial assumptions or descriptions, and its theory of
types for avoiding'paradoxes inhering in self-referential statements was the
exemplary achievement in "nonmetaphysical"linguistics or metamathematics. (Rad-
nitzky; I, p30f)
It will be tseful to add a final element in the program of most 20th century
logical positivism or logical empiricism (terms with nearly overlapping meanings)
that appears in much of that literature as a descendant of principles 4'and 5'
above.
7')(the desirability of insulating science from society and the state) Although
the critique of metaphysics inherently distances positivistic inquiry from reli-
giously Inhospitable or politically intrusive governments bent on destroying
scientific autonomy, sciences main objective is theoretical knowledge cumulation,
not social emancipation. Social values, norms or prescriptive strategies are
not scientifically derivable; but their empirical presuppositions may nonetheless
be scientifically confirmed or rejected.
What do positivism, logical positivism or logical empiricism, so characterized,
have to say about science qua science? The first point to be made is that the
worship of physics and Darwinian biology in early "positivist" views strongly
suggests the corollary that all knowledge, if it is to be considered valid or
secure knowledge, must be scientific. Secondly, there is the argument of the
early positivists, including Wittgenstein, that propositions are either synthetic,
(empirical, sense-data, factual, as above), analytical (logical, of a deductive
character or an inductive cast), or meaningless ("poetry", "prescription",
metaphysics"). The security of scientific knowledge is then to be derived from
its basis entirely in synthetic and analytical propositions. As in 4' and 5'
above, scientific statements must be valid in the restrictive sense of being
logically true or directly or indirectly empirically verifiable, and perhaps
also verified. Thus secure, "scientific" knowledge resides in logically and
empirically proven knowledge, a position Popper traces back to Aristotle
and Lakatos calls "justificationism."
In recent times, there has been considerable refinement in these views, as
when the Kantian category of "synthetic-apriori" knowledge, knowledge that is
logically certain yet empirical in nature, was struck down first by the
existence of logically consistent non-Euclidean geometries, second by Einstein's
successful use of such new geometries in his celestial mechanics.
The Humean argument that one cannot prove general propositions, slowly led
to a concern for developing probabilistic standards of induction and proof.
(Russell, Keynes, Carnap, Nagel) Clear reflections of this concern for demon-
strable truth are also seen in the Whitehead-Russell attempt logically to
derive all true propositions "by logical methods" from the knowledge of all
true, including factual and other atomic propositions, (see noteS). Whereas
Leibniz believed that language was logical and Frege envisioned all propositions
as but alternate names of "truth" and "falsehood,' Russell or Carnap could
extend this view to think that both mathematics and the real world of science
were truth-functional.
II. The Response of Popperian Critical Rationalism
We will give special attention here to the views of Karl Popper, an important
early critic of both positivism, logical empiricism and dialectical philosophy, as
well as a central figure in the formation of Kuhn's views on paradigms, and the
bete noir of Adorno and Habermas in The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology.
But we will do so with the special purpose of placing his views on the rough,
multidimensional ordering between positivism and dialectics mentioned above.
During World War II, Popper wrote his The Open Society and its Enemies (Plato,
Hegel and Marx) to attack "the revolt against reason" apparent to him in the
ideologically split world of the 1930s, in Freudian accounts of human nature, and
in the historicist and relativistic views of Hegel, Marx, Toynbee and others
(Popper, 1946 thrcugh 1962). By "historicism" he meant the view that "the method
of a science of society" should be "the study of history, and especially of the
tendencies inherent in the historical development of mankind," e.g. towards
progress. Popper considers philosophical, moral or historical views "relativistic"
if they argue for the arbitrariness or nonrationality of moral or scientific choice,
including the view that laws true of one historical period need not be true of the
next one. (Popper, 1962, Vol. II, pp. 8-9, 319, 369)
His own "falsificationist" view of appropriate scientific method replaces
"scientific certainty by scientific progress" in the search for truth; it also
serves to demarcate science from nonscience.
"For science does not develop by a gradual encyclopedic
accumulation of essential information, as Aristotle thought,
but by a much more revolutionary method; it progresses by
bold ideas, by the advancement of new and very strange theories
(such as the theory that the earth is not flat...) and by the
overthrow [or 'refutation' or 'falsification'] of the old ones."
(Popper, The Open Society,
II, 1962, p. 12f)
In what surely presages Kuhn's thinking, Popper sees theoretical revolutions as
real; but properly understood, science embodies a revolution in methods, the
reliance on a dialectic of bold conjectures and empirical refutations.
Let me summarize here his views on logic, criticism and scientific explanation;
they will also be relevant for our subsequent discussion of Popper's relation to
logical empiricism. For Popper, formal (or deductive) logic is the "organon of
criticism"; [D]eductive logic is not only the theory of the transmission of truth
from the premise to the conclusion, but it is also... the theory of the retransmission
of falsity from the [false] conclusion to at least one of the premises." It becomes
the theory of all "rational criticism" as well, which "takes the form of an attempt
to show that unacceptable conclusions can be derived from the assertion we are
trying to criticize." Modern logic has rehabilitated the absolutist concept of
truth (a proposition's correspondence with the facts or things as they are). In
natural and social science we criticize the truth claims of theories - deductive
systems - by falsifying conclusions logically derived from, and thus tentatively
explained by, theory and some initial conditions. (Popper, in Adorno et al., 1976,
pp. 98-101). One is tempted to characterize such views as anti-inductivist and anti-
verificationistic yet clearly positivistic. Finally, Popper can be said to differ
from positivism rather significantly concerning its claimed wholesale anti-metaphysical
character. Principally this may due to his much greater awareness that both his
deductive falsificationism and his methodological individualism (an aversion toward
treating collective agencies as real) are tenants just as metaphysical and unprov-
able as realistic logical atomism. Popper clearly objects as well to the repressed
metaphysics in the historicist subspecies of positivism and dialectical materialism
which impute "meanings" or "progress" as "immanent" in history.
In terms of our pre-articulated standards of comparison, Popper agrees in the
main with somewhat more than half of the core positivist program -- its antidog-
matic emulation of mathematical physics -- but he objects rather fundamentally to
its inductive and verificationist observational theories, its inconsistent anti-
metaphysical self-understanding, and its historical progessivism, at least in
certain of their variants.
How then does Popper fare as a "logical empiricist" in terms of the seven dis-
criminating criteria laid out above? If Popper's differences with positivism
entitle him to at least legal grounds for separation, if not divorce, his diff-
erences with logical empiricism might better be described as a lover's quarrel,
combined with a methodological shift in interest. The points of disagreement are
most clearly the inductive and verificationist doctrines of logical empiricism
deriving from objectionable positivistic roots.
As for the unified science prineple, Popper heavily endorses a mathodological,
not a disciplinary variant of this view. Progress is not "immanent" in history.
"In science (and only in science) can we say that we have made genuine progress:
that we know more than we did before." (Popper, in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds),
1970, p. 57). The root discipline for "enlightenment concerning the aims of science,
and its possible progress" is the philosophical logic of discovery, not the "spurious
sciences" of history, psychology or sociology, (ibid., p. 57f). This discipline is
more concerned with logically clarifying and improving knowledge cumulation than
with J's idea of physical reductionism. Popper's criterion for progress, enhanced
truth content residing in nonfalsified theories, admits of some complicating
qualifications, however, Thus theories are never unambiguously falsified in a
probabilistic world; moreover, as Duhem and others have argued, theories can be
temporarily saved by the introduction of appropriate ad hoc hypotheses. These
might concern, for example, new meanings for key terms, stiffer ceteris paribus
assumptions, or different ways of measuring derivative concepts and testing
various predictions. Popper would prefer such adjustments to have more possible
empirical truth content, and thus to be even more falsifiable than their pre-
decessor.
As a label for the presumably expanding content area of true science, "non-
falsified theory" also requires further discussion. Clearly it is a matter of
degree, for which a positive concept other than "verified theory" needs to be
found. "By the degree of corroboration of a theory I mean a concise report
evaluating the state (at a certain time t) of the critical discussion of a theory,
with respect to the way it solves its problems; its degree of testability; the
severity of the tests it has undergone; and the way it has stood up to these
tests." (Popper, 1972, p. 18)
Points 2', 3' and 4' elaborate the ideal-typical logical empiricist's views
on physics, reductionism to an ideal logical language and the ideal of explanation
via hypothetical-deductive knowledge systems. Although he quotes Carnap and
Tarski more than Whitehead and Russell, Popper's methodological views, as summarized
above, fit these principles easily. Einstein, for example, may well be Popper's
ideal scientist. Presumably, distinguishing among the different deductive mathe-
matical theories different scientists use, Popper appears to assume what Whitehead
and Russell had started to show -- the equivalence of deductions using such
formalisms to the deductions of standard formal logic. In these views, Popper also
does not differ much from Nagel, Merton, Smelser, Easton and other "mainstream"
social theorists and philosophers to be discussed further below.
Relating Popper's views, as we have summarized them, to point 5' of the logical
empiricist program, the principle of empiricism, is also not difficult. Although
Popper certainly would claim that science was grounded in experience, he has
consistently rejected any claims that such experience was unmediated by theory or
problem definitions. The basic or primitive terms of the scientific theory are
not directly given observations, as in 5'a; the meaning of these terms must be
decided upon by the scientific community. Can one accept the interpretation of
point 5'b in terms of "perceptual experience" as Popperian? If we recall that
the replication of individual measurements is a key element in Popperian science
but remember also that general laws can never be "verified" in his view, then this
version of the principle of empiricism despite its quasi-tautological character
may be considered part of the Popperian perspective.
As for extensionality, Popper's views point strongly in this direction, even
though they are again more nuanced and sophisticated. First of all, his passionate
rejection of Aristotelian essentialism is very Russellian: "The Aristotelian notion
of essence was the forerunner, no doubt, of the modern notion of intension or
meaning.' ISecondly, Popper's extremely strong (one might say overstrong) equation
of rational criticism with the use of standard deductive logic seems decisive on
this point: standard deductive logic is extensional in very much the sense that
Whitehead and Russell meant it.
Nonetheless, if one is to believe the previously quoted views of Whitehead
and Russell, there is a certain tension between philosophical logic and mathe-
matical logic, which does not appear to be entirely resolved in Popper's views
when he equates critical rationality with standard deductive logic. His criticisms
of "scientism" in the "spurious" social sciences is not only, or not mainly that
they avoid deductive logic or use it improperly; rather it is that their methodology
is too inductivist and not sufficiently falsificationist. Both such views of the
"logic of discovery" would traditionally be considered "logical" (in either Hegel's
or John Stuart Mill's senses of the term); neither argument is strictly formal
or mathematical. Popper's consideration of such principles as requiring the
"decision" of the investigator or as "metaphysical" appears to remove their defense
from rational discussion, unless we allow the existence of some kind of "discursive"
logic appropriate to rational debate in some broader senses of "rationality." I/
Concerning 7', the desirability of insulating science from society and the
state, Popper's strong concerns for the regulative ideal of truth represents
a clear restatement of this older concern of logical empiricism. His realism
concerning both the obvious influences that the state or church can have and the
need for a minimally supportive social environment of science certainly tempers
his absolutism or purism concerning the ideal of truth. But, in what is surely
more controversial, in a very anti-dialectical, and anti-psychoanalytic 'passage,
Popper has said that "self-analysis is no substitute for those practical actions
which are necessary for establishing the democratic institutions which alone can
guarantee the freedom of critical thought, and the progress of science." (TLe
Open Society, 1962, II, p. 223, italics added).
In sum, and preparatory to our discussion of the "paradigms" debate proper, we
find Popper substantially in agreement with some version of all of the key prin-
ciples of logical empiricism as Radnitzky and others have defined them. His
differences with other variants of this view are certainly not trivial, however,
since they again concern his "logical", anti-dialectical, "falsificationist"
and "anti-inductionist" stance, a methodological orientation which has had con-
siderable influence in the development of modern, non-Marxist philosophy of
science. And, were we to have given definitional status to the root of the
"ideal logical language" component of logical empiricism, which Popper, more
than most logical empiricists, could admit to be metaphysical, other serious
differences would have been found.
III. From Popper to Kuhn to Lakatos to Feyerabend
In his "Second Thoughts on Paradigms," Kuhn gives an especially clear account
of the connections between logical empiricism and the origin of his use of the
term "paradigm".
The analogy between a scientific theory and a pure mathematical
system has been widely exploited in twentieth-century philosphy
of science and has been responsible for some extremely interest-
ing results. But it is only an analogy and can therefore be
misleading. [In addition to the "well-known difficulties"
associated with identifying "an empirically meaningful basic
vocabulary"...] Empirical content must enter formalized theories
from the top as well as the bottom. ...Any account of the cog-
nitive apparatus of a scientific community may reasonably be
asked to tell us something about the way in which the group's
members, in advance of directly relevant empirical evidence,
identify the special formalism [e.g., a variant of "f = ma"]
appropriate to a particular problem, especially to a new problem
[e.g., the motion of a pedulum]. ...the term "paradigm"
... entered The Structure of Scientific Revolutions because I...
could not, when examining the membership of a scientific comm-
unity, retrieve enough shared rules to account for the group's
unproblematic conduct of research. Shared examples of success-
ful practice could ...provide what the group lacked in rules....
Unfortunately...I allowed the term's applications to expand,
embracing all shared group commitments, all components of what
I now wish to call the disciplinary matrix. (Kuhn, 1977, pp.
299-301, 318-319.)
Although Kuhn's views thus have roots in a much larger literature than Popper's
previous writings, he starts his contribution to the debate summarized in Lakatos
and Musgrave (eds), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge by noting fundamental
views that they share. Both have shifted away from preoccupation with the logical
form of ideal scientific sentences ("the logical form of the products") of scien-
tific enquiry, to concern themselves with the "historical", "dynamic process by
which scientific knowledge is acquired" (p. 1). This newer concern amounts to
a version of l', the unified science principle, that is methodological rather than
disciplinary, and ihdicates a rather significant retreat from active pursuit of
the reductionist program, principle 3' of logical empiricism, on the part of both
Popper and Kuhn. Given Popper's clear revulsion toward most social science in
general and historicism's search for historical lessons in particular, however,
Popper's preference for philosophical -- logical and rational -- reconstructions
of scientific discoveries belies fundamental agreement with Kuhn on the adequacy
of historical accounts.
Kuhn indicates several theses of "classical positivism" that both he and Popper
- object to. "We both emphasize... the intimate and inevitable entanglement of
scientific observation with scientific theory; we are correspondingly skeptical
of efforts to produce any neutral observation language; and we both insist that
scientists may properly aim to invent theories that explain [rather than merely
subsume or name] observed phenomena and that do so in terms of (metaphysically]
real objects...." (p. 2). (Russell wanted to assume as little as possible about
existence and to reduce "causality" to predictive lawfulness). Both authors are
anti-inductivists and against an accretionist model of knowledge accumulation
in that they admit to revolutions in scientific knowledge.
Similarly Lakatos attributes the vast success of Kuhn's book to his popularization
of Koyre's persuasive, anti-positivistic, historical view that scientific changes
are connected with "vast cataclysmic metaphysical revolutions" in "metaphysical
research programmes", like the Einstein-Planck revolution studied by Popper; he
sees Popper as principally concerned, however, with defeating the probabilistic
justificationism or verificationism which I have above mentioned as a variant of
Russell's, Carnap's or Nagel's logical empiricism (ibi., pp. 92-95 and notes). In
a review that both criticizes and defends Kuhn's views, Feyerabend begins by
acknowledging that the beneficial effects of discussions with him have included
various "criticisms of some features of contemporary methodology" made in articles
on "Problems of Empiricism" and the first version of his later book (debating,
and dedicated to, Lakatos): Against Method. (Feyerabend, in Lakatos and Musgrave,
(eds.), p. 197) In this later volume Feyerabend describes Popperian "critical
rationalism" as "the most liberal positivistic methodology in existence today,"
(p. 171); he argues as well that Habermas and Adorno "seem to be justified in
calling Popper a positivist" because "Critical rationalism arose from the attempt
to solve Hume's problem (of induction from particular experiences to universal
causal laws] and to understand the Einsteinian revolution, and it was then extended
-to politics and even to the conduct of one's private life" (p. 175). And he assumes
that critical rationalism a fortiori includes the "principles of logical empiricism"
(p. 179). Feyerabend's comment certainly argues for both the reinterpretation of
the "paradigms" debate in terms of the correction of positivistic and logical
empiricist views, and it makes easier the transitional link to The Positivist
Dispute in German Sociology.
Where do these authors disagree? In very heated language, Kuhn's critics,
Popperians and others, have accused him of making the matter of theory choice a
matter for "mob psychology" (Lakatos) involving "Mere persuasive displays without
deliberative substance," omitting appeals to "good reasons of any kind, factual
or otherwise." (Sources in Kuhn, 1977, p. 321). Ambiguities are legion.
In "The Nature of a Paradigm" Masterman collates Kuhn's twenty-one meanings
into three primary kinds: cosmological or metaphysical paradigms of a philosophical
sort; exemplary concrete achievements judicially applied within a scientific
community, i.e., sociological paradigms; and, even more concretely, classic texts
or actual instrumentation which serve like grammatical tense forms for a foreign
language or crude analogies or a specified gestalt-figure as artifact or construct
paradigms. Paradigm change in the first sense corresponds to major revolutions
in world view such as the transition from the paratactic universe of the archaic
Greeks to the substance-appearance essentialism of their classical followers, and
the transition from Copernican cosmology to Einstein-Planck quantum theoretic
relativity, as much discussed by Koyre, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend.
Paradigm content in the sociological sense comes close to what Kuhn now refers
to more comprehensively as a disciplinary matrix, which includes both cosmological,
exemplary and artifactual elements. These elements are interrelated, "form a
whole and function together" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 182), but not always in a mutally
reinforcing way (see the example of behavioristic learning theory below and Lakatos'
account of Bohr's progress on inconsistent foundations, op. cit. p. 140ff).
One of the important agreements among second generation Popperians (such as
Lakatos) and even more dialectical thinkers like Kuhn and Feyerabend is that scien-
tific choice involves more than hypotheses or even separate theories. Historically
and social psychologicall Kuhn is concerned with paradigm choice, in the most
comprehensive sociological sense of a disciplinary matrix. These matrices include
a) metaphysical paradigms (cosmological, ontological, and heuristic models and
beliefs);
b) scientific and other values;
c) symbolic generalizations (readily formalizeable statements or explicit
formalisms that allow logical and mathematical manipulations and serve
partly as laws, definitions or theories); also
d) exemplars (shared ways of seeing how to apply formalisms and solve homework
exercises in classic texts, community-wide laboratory instruction in the
use of technical instrumentation, and other shared construct paradigms in
Masterman's sense.
Rather similar to Kuhn's sociological disciplinary matrices are Lakatos'
"research programl, which generate comparable sequences of theoretical respecifi-
cations. Within his research programs are irrefutable cores (containing purely
metaphsycial beliefs, negative heuristics indicating beliefs that program adherents
refuse to try and falsify, and positive heuristics that hint how to develop
refutable variants of the research program) which are combined with auxiliary
assumptions in a "protective belt" with "construction' of sequences of testible
theories. ia
Masterman, like Kuhn, focuses retrospectively on the exemplary new way of seeing
that a construct paradigm generates either as a concrete picture or model used
analogically, or as "an analogy-drawing sequence of word-uses in natural language."
(pp. 76-88). She suggests that a crude analogy has the following logical charac-
teristics:
"(a) a crude analogy is finite in extensibility
(b) it is incomparable with any other crude analogy
(c) it is extensible only by an inferential process of
'replication', which can be examined by using the
computer-programming technique of 'inexact matching',
but*not by the normal methods of examining inference."
(p. 79).
Recall that PM's propositional functions were similarly ambiguous as to referant,
and dependent on intensional meanings for their use. Because extensibility in
truth-functional thinking refers to well defined sets of objects for which a
proposition is true, several of Kuhn's more controversial points can become clearer
in terms of this explication as well as the rationale for his attempt("Second
Thoughts") to computer model the precise but not wholly abstract, rule-governed,
conscious process of sensation.
Like Popper, Kuhn agrees that "progress" is "a perquisite reserved almost
exclusively for the activities we call science"; like Popper, Kuhn argues there
is no proof of a theory's truthfulness. But going beyond an anti-positivism shared
with Popper, Kuhn generalizes the objection to inductionism and neutral basic
observation sentences: "There is no neutral algorithm for theory [or paradigm]
-choice [defined in terms of scope, accuracy, fruitfulness, etc., considerations],
no systematic decision procedure which, properly applied, must lead 
each individual
[in the scientific group logically] to the same decision." (Kuhn, 1970, p. 160
and p. 200). No "semantically neutral techniques exist for theory choice; no
logical or merely syntactical rules exist for tomparatively measuring 
the truth
content of observational or experimental consequences of two theories stated in
a shared basic vocabulary (ibid., p. 158 and p. 234).
For Kuhn revolutionary discoveries are those from which new phenomena emerge.
Disciplined, but partly tacit, gestalt changes or "1conversions" to "new ways" of
"sensing" or "seeing" stimuli occur. The set of things to which basic terms
refer mutates, and the terms themselves take on new, vivid -- but peripherally
vague -- intensional meanings and more than syntactically unclear extensional
references, which do not nicely subsume earlier set boundaries. Extensibility will
doubtless be contextually sensitive to "old" ways of seeing. Logical reductionism
in the sense of principle 3' may not be possible.
For example: after the discovery of Uranus "comets" became possible "planets";
after Copernicus the moon could have "mountains" and Westerners could "see" sun-
spots the Chinese had noted for centuries; experimental error in measuring electric
attraction became -- in part -- electrostatic repulsion; Leyden jars designed to
hold an electrical "fluid" suddenly didn't have to be "jars" at all; after Einstein
matter became energy, velocity became "relative" and space became "curved". For
such discoveries a "topdown" gestalt-like flip corresponding to the difficulty
of recognizing "bottom up" a red six of spades is required, and when it comes,
previous extensible taxonomies usually get superceded in nonadditive, nonaccre-
tionary not obviously cumulative ways. Parly new and incommensurable universes of
potentially "understandable" and "anomalous" experiences became possible. Many
previous anomalies get reinterpreted in terms of the "gradual and simultaneous
emergence of both observational and conceptual recognition" with a consequent "change
of paradigm categories and [laboratory] procedures" and resultant new anomalies,
changes that are frequently resisted. (Kuhn, 1970, p. 70) 13
Now to Kuhn's attempts to redefine or supercede Popper's falsificationist
demarcation principle for distinguishing science from non-science. Kuhn's most
important empirical thesis deriving from his concept of exemplars is perhaps that
of the pervasiveness within (sub)disciplinary scientific groups of "normal science,
a stronger, puzzle-solving oriented, more collective form of what Popper had
earlier called the principle of (personal) tenacity.
If the investigator fails to solve such puzzles, e.g. by manipulating auxiliary
hypothesis or formalisms, his ingenuity is normally impugned, rather than the
validity of the disciplinary matrix's most basic heuristics or symbolic generaliza-
tions.
Kuhn's view makes the ideal, "normal" scientific society sound like a dogmatic,
"closed society," surely a view he was aware Popper would object to! To turn
(Popper's] view on its head, it is precisely the abandonment of critical discourse
[characteristic of normal science] that makes the transition to a ["mature" or
"normal"] science. Once a field has made that transition, critical discourse recurs
only at moments of crisis when the bases of the field are again in jeopardy,"
(Kuhn, in Lakatos and Musgrave, eds., pp. 4-6), which can happen when many investi-
gators fail to resolve a growing number of puzzling anomalies, or an allied group
of specialists produces results fundamentally contradicting basic elements of a
disciplinary matrix (Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, p. 181, etc.). It must be
noted that this recursive demarcation of science in terms of its normal self is at
least partially tautological and not wholly satisfactory, a point Kuhn realizes.
Kuhn's image of scientific progress gives a definitely verificationist cast to
normal scientific activity. For Kuhn, "anomalies" rarely become falsifications.
Kuhn, like Lakatos, argues more decisively than Popper that one theory is not
falsified unless there is a better one to replace it (one, Lakatos would say, with
"higher corroborated content," op. cit., p. 180). Normal science allows consider-
able incremental knowledge growth, and (dialectically) also makes rather infrequent
revolutions possible and fruitful. It generates a lot of very ingenious effort
directed toward puzzle solving, which amounts on rare occasions of snowballing
failure to the severe, revolutionary falsification efforts that Popper calls for,
but for a different reason. The triumph of a new theory in such a situation amounts,
says Kuhn, to a kind of comparative verification.
How and why do such triumphs or revolutions occur? Because there is no instant
rationality or singly decisive "cricial experiments", Lakatos revises Popper's
and Kuhn's views by saying that competition is really between rival research
programs, generating series of theories that better fit reality, rather than
isolated theories. He and Toulmin object historically to the Kuhnian idea of the
tendency for mature scientific communities monopolistically to suspend rival
research programs ("paradigms"). An "objective", rather than a "social-psychological",
reason for rejecting one program for constructing protective belts is the success
of a rival program which explains the previous success of its rival and supersedes
it by a further display of heuristic power e.g. the ability to anticipate theoretically
novel facts and even novel auxiliary (measurement) theories in its growth. (Rj.
cit. p. 155, p. 175). Lakatos argues that Popper can be read as a "sophisticated
(pragmatic) methodological falsificationist" who sees that research programs are
never definitively falsified, entering rather into "degenerating problem shifts", i.e.
"crises" associated with theory sequences that use heuristically unmotivated and
uncorroborated ad hoc adjustments in the search for new or better fits. The loss
of heuristic power should be recognized as a bad state to be in, but one in whteh
dogmatic tenacity may be of some scientific value. Normal science includes both
degenerating and progressive phases. Unlike nonscientific naive trial and error
thinking, both scientific phases involve "deductive guessing" guided by a rational
research program, combined with the "determination to eliminate, under -certain
objectively defined conditions [the arrival of a superior alternativelsome research
programmes." (ibid., p. 177, including note 4). His demarcation of science from
nonscience thus integrates Popper's attack on scientistic inductionism and Kuhn's
very similar treatment of "deductive guessing"- paradigm-guided puzzle solving!
One of Lakatos' most provocative claims vis a vis the Kuhn-Masterman emphasis
on partial "incommensurability"' is the claim that most history of science is, and
should be "internal" history. By this phrase, which surely recalls the language
of philosophical logic ("intensionality," and Hegelian-Marxian "internal relations,"
if not Aristotelian essentialism or historicism) he means activity following the
protective self methodology of scientific research programs. AIt represents as
well a claim that rationally reconstructable replacement of old research programs
by their betters means a reductionistic, extensible, rational, unified account of
knowledge cumulation is possible (recall unified reductionist, principles 1' and
3' of logical empiricism). This rational reconstruction takes place neither in
the material world nor in the second world of consciousness, but in Popper and
Platos third "world of ideas" (truth, standards, propositions, objective, articu-
lated knowledge), which is independent of knowing subjects" (Lakatos, 1970, p179'
plus notes).
Kuhn's views on the how and why of revolutionary scientific succession are
parallel in certain respects to the Popper-Lakatos view, but in other ways very
different. He stresses that the partial incommensurability of partly tacit ways
of seeing and puzzle solving gives cross-paradigm conflicts a political or even
religious character. With breakdown or disagreement over fundamentals, conflicts
over the relative importance of different scientific values, over the institutions
of training and research promotion occur; typically, cosmological views rein-
forcing or undermining different ways of seeing or generating data and its inter-
pretations are involved. Scientific revolutions thus have the quality of dialetical
"supercessions" in both their cosmological-metaphysical aspects, their exemplary
ways of seeing, and in the rest of their disciplinary matrix as well. The extent
of "revolution", however, may be limited to 25 or 50 specialists within 'a particular
research community. The significance of such "conversions" to a new way of seeing
and different research heuristics vary with the extent to which fundamental
restructuring of their own and overlapping disciplinary commitments takes place.
As for hope that a rational logic can decide such matters or Lakatos' appeal
to objective criteria for the supercession of a particular research program, he
answers that no guaranteed rules, but the discursive reason of group discussion
and debate is necessary for the choice among the competing values involved in
such issues; the process involved is social-psychological and historical, even
though various good arguments (none of them logically decisive) can be made,
such as appeals to greater precision and scope, or simplicity or sensational new
factual discoveries. (On these points, Feyerabend takes an even more extreme,
"anarchistic" position arguing that no rules can guarantee progress, even rules
inveighing against political interference or propagandistic arguments. In fact,
Galileo broke such rules in promoting his at the time empirically doubtful views.)
In what must have been most provocative, given the whole thrust of The Open
Society and Its Enemies, Kuhn even argues that Popper's methdological appeals
for more bold conjectures and serious refutation attempts are procedural maxims,
not logical criteria. As such they are ideological (dared he to have said "his-
toricist"?) appeals, part of a psycho-social influence process directed toward
the scientific societal and philosophical communities.
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Kuhn (in Scientific Revolutions, Chapter XI) and Feyerabend at great length
go on to make an argument that most modern historians of science tend, at least
in part, to agree with: that linearized scientific textbooks conceal the contro-
versial nature of most revolutionary scientific periods. This may be justified
in the interests of efficient inculcation of the exemplary skills necessary to
do normal science, but it downplays the incommensurabilities of cross-paradigm
choice, tends to give only the evidence supporting the winning side, and incorporate
the winning paradigm's rationalist reinterpretation of the succeeded program's
previous successes without noting the actual contradictions between the originally
stated positions. For example, Kepler's actual laws contradicted Hewton's famous
formulas, even though the version of Kepler's laws we see in textbooks do not,
and Galileo's treatment of motion made for certain improvements in the prediction
of physical motion, but it lost the heuristic power of Aristotle's attempt to
conceive of causal relations characterizing both motions and emotions, physics,
biblogy and social reality.
IV. Dialectical Hermeneutics
There is a central reason for connecting the naradigms debate to the positivist
debate in German sociology. Both debates are explicitly about social science
methodology, i.e. historiography. All participants in that debate care deeply
about the appropriate way to write principled histories (or interpretations) of
an important social activity: science. I conclude this paper with a summary of
anti-positivist dialectical hermenuetics, as described in that debate.
But as an aside, I recall Kuhn's own story of his own discovery of interpretive
historical methodology, meaning for him . modern hermeneutics. When asked to
give some lectures on the origins of seventeenth-century mechanics, he decided to
find what Galileo and Newton had started from. One memorable, hot summer day, Kuhn
''all at once perceived the connected rudiments of an alternative way of reading the
texts" before him. For the first time he was duly hit by the fact that Aristotle's
subject was "change-of-quality in general, including both the fall of a stone and
the growth of a child to adulthood. In a universe where qualities were the
'ontologically primary and indestructible elements,' imposed on omnipresent neutral
matter, qualities constituted individual bodies or substances. In modern physics
bodies don't have identities; they are the subject of parsimonious, predictively
essential state variable characterization, like spatio-temporal location, mass,
velocity (momentum) and acceleration. But for Aristotle, since position was a
quality, motion was a change-of-state corresponding to child development; identity
was real, but preserved only in the "problematical sense that the child is the
individual it becomes'." (Kuhn, 1977, pxif) With this cognitive gestalt flip,
this new way of understanding, "strained metaphors often became naturalistic reports,
and much apparent absurdity vanished." What Galileo and others did was fundamen-
tally to revise the way of reading Aristotelian texts in order to say something
new. Thus Kuhn rediscovered "hermeneutics" at the same time he conceived his
dialectical idea of a scientific revolution.
A very early point made by Pabermas in the positivism debate is that dialectics
"retains from myth an insight forfeited by positivism ... that the research process
instigated by human subjects belongs, through the act of cognition itself, to the
objective context which should be apprehended." In Radnitzky's book th's becomes:df
1") (Fabermas__hilosophicalanthropology of science). Distinctive research-
guiding interests have always guided the sciences. In addition to naturalistic
or technical interests in prediction and control, recognizable alternatives
include the herreneutic interest "in intersubjective mediation [roughly, "trans-
mission"] of participatory understanding ... with respect to possible meaning of
actions or of texts that connect contemporaries and past generations" (Radnitzky,
II, p7) and the emancipatory interest, achieved through enlightenment, in freeing
mankind "from the quasi-natural forces of history and society" (ibid.) Such
knowledge interests are reflectively uncoverable not so much at the individual
motivational level, but at the level of "preconditions of the possibility of
certain types of" knowledge-constituting activities (Radnitzky, I, pxxxix).
Fabermas links his three knowledge-constitutive interests to different media
operating in the creation and maintenance of societies (work, language, plus
steering and control); he further distinguishes clusters of science corresponding
to the first three interests above: the natural sciences, the cultural sciences
derived from philology, and the critically oriented moral and social sciences,
(ibid, p6f). Hence the sciences are not "naturalistically" unified, as positivists
or analytical-empiricists would have us believe..
To this list Radnitzky adds an anti-positivist, Kuhnian "interest in improving
a [scientific cosmology of] worldpictures which contributes to knowledge growth
and an "interest in inproving reflection upon [ethically relevant] existential
themes" (ibid., II, pl2f) which influence the practice of life and are not buried
in insignificance by universal or historical laws. "(A]nalytical philosophy cannot
within its own frame reflect upon its underlying research-guiding interests, and
cannot attain an adequate self-understanding." (ibid, II, p1l)
Doesn't this view seem a much generalized version of Kuhn's emphasis on
cosmological/ontological change in scientific revolutions and his insistence
that hermeneutic consistency is an important scientific value, in some cases
pointing in different directions than deductive falsification efforts? Doesn't
such a broader conception of criticism fit Feyerabend's strictures against science
governed wholly by the unitary methodological rules of critical rationalism of
falsificationism?
2") (emancipatory hermenutics) Among the sciences now in existence, psycho-
analysis, non-uniquely, best approximates the ideal for social inquiry. In the
positivist dispute Adorno and Habermas are defending the "critical theory" orien-
tation of the Frankfurt school, which has its roots in dialectical social theory
(from Plato to Hegel to Marx), in Marxian historiography and in Freudian psycho-
analysis -- traditions that Popper (and Hitler, for different reasons) severely
attacked. In a series of remarks introducing the debate, Adorno uses the Freudian
model of analysis repeatedly, also appealing to the dialectical ideal of seeking
truth as totality. "Since the individual phenomenon conceals in itself the whole
society," (Adorno et al, p. 39) we miss the reality that the "overwhelming majority
of human beings tolerate relations of domination, identify themselves with them and
are motivated toward irrational attitudes by them -- attitudes whose contradiction
with the simplest interest of their self-preservation is obvious." The "core-of
the critique of positivism" by dialecticians "is that it shuts itself off from both
the experience of the blindly dominating totality and the [weakly?] driving desire
that it should ultimately become something else."
Following Apel and Habermas among others, Raditzsky distinguishes the cultural
sciences from the natural ones in terms of "entities with which the inquirer can
establish communication and may at least in principle enter into a dialogue and
those with which this is not possible," (Radnitzsky, II, p. 20f) thus updating
ontologically the older distinction between the understanding of meanings and the
explanations of objective things as knowledge-constituting interests or purposes.
He then characterizes psychoanalysis as a dialectical, yet complimentary combin-
ation of hermeneutic and emancipatory interests in self-understanding, achieved
in part by tacking between a hermeneutic inquiry and a technical search for causes.
[Als soon as the causes [of compulsions] are recognized by [the individual] as
his hidden reasons, become intelligible as such, they cease to work casually.
...Thus psychoanalysis -- especially in the form of the criticism of ideologies
patterned on it -- provides the model for the process of the successive reduction
of the irrational elements of the historical dialogue in which humanity has been
engaged and which is an infinite process."
Ironically, Popper's bate noires have become ideal models for a political program
in some ways similar to his own but one paying far more attention to unconscious
forces, to social domination and to psychological repression. Radnitsky argues
that such a psychoanalytic perspective synthesizes two variants of the hermeneutic
tradition, and objective interpreter's approach (Verstehen) and an engaged,
ex ftential, dialectical or judicial approach emphasizing emancipatory understand-
in" Popper's situational analysis approach is an individualistic rather
th-,- a holistic version of only the former, however.
Both strands of the hermeneutic approach presuppose, and creatively take
advantage of: (5") (the hermeneutic circle) There is "No development of
knowledge without foreknowledge" (Radnitzky, II, p. 23). Here Popper's "No
knowledge without problems; but also, no problems without knowledge," fits
the objective interpretation (Verstehen) emphasis, while Habermas comes down
again on the existential: [T]he meaning of the research process as a whole must
be understood before I can know to what the empirical validity of basic state-
ments is related, just as the judge must always have grasped the meaning of
judicature as such." Habermas sounds positively Kuhnian (or should we say
vice versa?!) "The so-called [observational] basis-problem simply does not appear
if we regard the research process as part of a comprehensive process of socially
nstitutionalized actions [a disciplinary matrix?] through which social groups
sustain their naturally precarious life."
Habermas begins his "Postscript" to the Popper-Adorno controversy with a very
hegelian quotation from Adorno: "Societal totality does not lead a life of its
own over and above that which it unites and of which it, in its turn, is composed.
It produces and reproduces itself through its individual moments." (Adorno et al..
p. 107).
3") (The daeticalapach to totality) "Nevertheless," iabermas continues,
"[the reciprocal] relation of a system to its elements, which is hypothetically
represented in the deductive connections of mathematical functions, [but can only
be apprehended in their reciprocity] has to be strictly distinguished from the.
relationship of the totality and its moments which can be revealed only in a dia-
lectical manner." a(Habermas, in Adorno et al., p. 131f).
Unpacking this way of thinking and speaking is difficult. The previous pages
in this paper point to just how fundamentally different such dialectic thought is
from the model of logical reductionism and hypothetical-deductive knowledge at
the core not only of logical empiricism (principles 3' and 4' and 6'), but
also the Popper-Lakatos program of objective, internally defined, rationally
reconstructable knowledge.
A preliminary reading of such texts immediately suggests that both the
ontological "logical atomism" of so much rational choice theory and the holism of
various mathematically formulated systems theories are seen as inferior to the
relational essentialism of Hegel and Marx. (Recall from Marx's sixth thesis on
Feuerbach the claim that "But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in
each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.")
Reflective social investigators, as well as the objects of their investigations,
are subjective agencies seeking autonomy within the "objective" natural world of
which they are internally related parts.
Habermas elaborates upon the psychoanalytic ideal, both its emancipatory use
of naturalistic generalizations (critically treated as reifications or social
objectifications, not inexorable natural laws) and its refusal to be totally
satisfied with the self-understanding contained in merely subjective ideas and
intrepretations. These depend in part on an "objective configuration of societal
reproduction". Dialectics confronts the object with what it "seeks to be" when
left to itself as compared to what it is; criticism is made in terms of the "tension
of the possible and the real...." "By linking the method of [engaged] Verstehen
in this manner with the objectivating procedures of casual-analytic science and by
permitting the realization of both through a mutually transcending critique, the
dialectical approach overcomes the separation of theory and history." And it
denies as well Popper's ideal of timeless, objective knowledge in a non-dialectical
third world "independent of knowing subjects."
Naturalistic mathematics remains "external," in the dialectical perspective,
to the "natural hermeneutics of the social life-world" even when objective, reified
social regulatities are discovered. The intentional constitution of meaning and
action is also necessary. Concepts "capable of expressing substance and function
in one", not content-free "relational forms" of the Russellian variety are required.
"Moments" of social totalities might be thought of as aspects of societal life-worlds
that are unified or "reciprocally" and "internally" related in historical life-
contexts by their essential (capitalistic?) generative modes of work, speech and
control. These are not the "repetitive" or non-reflecting, lifeless systems for
which cogent empirical science is possible. (Fabermas in Adorno et al., p. 141)
(6") (dia-logical intensionality) "Nor is totality a class which might be
determined in its logical exteson bya collection of all the elements which it
comprises;" (Habermas, ibid., p. 131, and Adorno, ibid., p. 3f); it must be
dia-logically rather than monologically pursued.) Hasn't the repressed world of
philosophical or dialectical logic returned? Bernstein and Giddens, op. cit.,
not remarkably similar anti-logical empiricist themes in much recent literature.
Even Lakatos' "inner" history of science uses essentialist, dialectical language.
As either a philosophy of social scieng or a kind of philosophical attempt to
formalize the laws of correct thought, dialectical logic cannot be considered
rejected by contemporary philosopher-logicians, because too many scholars are
working on it. Progressive increases in falsifiable empirical content and
corroborated, theoretical claims are, perhaps, another matter for such traditions
of analysis.
References to discursive reason or "dia-logic" are neither obscurantist schol-
astics no cute neo-logisms, but brief cues to much larger debates concerning the
nature of truth, the democratic governability of advanced industrial societies
and the scope of human rationality. For both Adorno, Habermas, Kuhn and Lakatos,
social and scientific activities are "internally related" when metaphysical cores or
essential human potentialities are involved. Habermas' opting for a "consensual"
theory of truth treats Kuhn's argument in favor of autonomous scientific consensus
as reflective of a much broader political standard, most fully realized when all
participants are equally capable participants in very long dialogues or debates.
Habermas (Legitimation Crisis, 1975) argues that a key issue is "whether the repro-
duction of social life is still bound to [practicall reason and, especially,
whether generation of motives is still bound to internalization of norms that have
need of justification." Since Kant practical reasoning has meant the critical
hermeneutic search for the ultimate grounds of, or the universal laws appropriate
to, particular practical arguments.
"[I]t must be possible to decide whether dialectics, as positivism
asserts, oversteps the boundaries of verifiable reflection and merely usurps the
name of reason for an obscurantism which is all the more dangerous; or whether,
on the contrary, the codex of strict empirical sciences arbitrarily silences a
more comprehensive rationalization, and coverts the strenght of reflection, in
the name of precise distinction and sturdy empiricism, into sanctions against
thought itself." --J. Habermas, (Adorno et al, 1976, p. 143)
In the positivist dispute, Adorno agrees with Popper that critical rationality
should be the organon of social theory, even though a somewhat broader conception
of logic and reason (Hegel's "determinate negation") may be involved. (p. 113)
Habermas openly admits the value of empiricists' concern with experience --
-"[E]ven a dialectical theory cannot clash with an experience, however restructed it
may be" (p. 135). But the cosmological/ontological concept of totality in Marx,
Hegel and critical theory (all differently defined) and the vision of capitalism's
structural "determinations" affecting almost everything in art, science and society
have implications even for the logical empirical method of explanatory causal
theorizing, with its appeal to naturalistic experimental testing procedures. As
suggested by 3" above, "[Plrobably no experiment could convincingly demonstrate
the dependence of each social phenomenon on the totality" because 4") "the
-_whole which preforms the tangible phenomena can never itself be reduced to particular
experimental arrangements.... The critical path is not merely formal but also
material. If its concepts are to be true, critical sociology is, according to
its own idea, necessarily also a critique of society..." (Adorno, in Adorno et al.,
p. 113f).
Without arguing the many controversial issues such a principle raises, let me
repeat one of Adorno's most suggestive illustrations of his dialectical treatment
of material contradictions. "If social science... takes the concept of a liberal
society as implying freedom and equality" and then "disputes the truth-content of
these categories under liberalism" because "of the inequality of the social power
which determines the relations between people," "then these are not logical contra-
dictions which could-be eliminated by means of more sophisticated definitions, nor
are they subsequently emergent empirical restrictions of a provisional definition,
but rather, they are the structural situation of society itself" (ibid., p. 115).
This extremely provocative, but difficult example of self-contradicting constitutive
definition builds from core assumptions about both a society's contradictory
"essential" or "internal" organizing principles and its "inherent" possibilities for
emancipatory transformation. Partly in the spirit of Popper's methodological
-- /
"nominalism' discussed above, I call this a "theory-laden definitions approach,"
and have tried elsewhere to suggest non-trivial, meaningful ways in which such
definitions, as well as assertions using them, allow empirical testing and
revision. (B. Ollman's Alienation and Elster's Logic in Society are most relevant here.)
7") (The Unity of Social Theory and Social Practice). Despite the disunity
of knowledge interests and motives underlying and constituting social science
knowledge:
a) social theory and practice achieve unity through the image of man's striving
for emancipatory understanding inherent both in these knowledge constituting
motives or interests of scientific discourse and in the practical reflections of
the objects of investigation themselves. According to the consensual theory of
truth, scientific discourse presupposes and hence should consciously reflect both
the deductive and the practical rationality of all of society's members, each
equally unconstrained. Hence, hermeneutic, emancipatory and existential interests
directly connect parochial human practices with the general social theories such
practices require, use or help generate. Technical interests in prediction and
control -- even the concept of quasi-experimental "causality" used in the physical
sciences -- also indirectly but instrumentally connect social practice and social
theory. Clearly world-picture building activities -- to cite the last knowledge
constituting interest Radnitzky adds to Habermas' list -- play a role in both the
development of social ethics and the disciplinary "ways of seeing" characteristic
of particular research programs or paradigms.
Nonetheless the reconciliation of the actual and the emancipatory possible
envisioned by hermeneutic dialectics is not without serious alternative possibil-
ities:
b) such unities of theory and practice, as actually achieved, will in varying
degrees be flawed, distorted, or onesided. To say that theory and practice are
internally related through mankind's search for emancipatory self-understanding
is not to deny 'the failings involved in actual practice. Psychologically repressed,
market-steered, power distorted, or parochially self-serving misrepresentations of
totality may frequently be found. Critically detaching oneself from at least part
of one's context is often scientifically required. But the haloed value-neutrality
of Weberian objectivistic hermeneutics (descriptive Verstehen) needs critically
to be superceded through realizations that a) the scholar is always engaged with
the society or text he or she is trying to understand, b) his or her individual
knowledge-seeking reflects, often unconsciously, mixes of social domination and
emancipation interests; c) "values" themselves, however, one tries to realize,
exchange or neutralize them, are as scientific concepts partially distorted,
occluded conceptions of ftill human dignity.
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b) ideal tvnes, constructs or preoneratioral formal synolic Models that abstractly
realize certain netascientific beliefs And values
c) quasi-tautolonical symbolic laws, appropriately expressed
d) auxiliary ensurenent theories that help concretize b) an-i c) above vis a vis Aa)
below
P) theoretical (re)specifications suggested by or consistent uith the above, yet re-
visable in the light of experience (the "protective belt")
4. p cuulative literature, base' or. exenplars, also medinte' tronti svn!olic generali-
mations, containing sone increases in corroboratcd content
a) net? evidence, fron ne" contexts, of predictIve, interinretive, etninnatorv or emarn-
cipatory success using possibly update(! exenplars'nnid ermIrica-1" anptied positive
heuristics
1) new data discoveries; corroborated auxilinry mensurenent thenries
c) other adaptive/transfornative adjustnents in 1), .?) an" 1) vis a via 6), such as
.i) a reneweV list of oumnling phenomena or anonalies ta!:en to !-e uorth trying to
account for bv those traired In an exenplarv wav of seeIng,
ii) revised validity/testalility standards, better meshed iith ne-nscIentific and
synholic elenents, or
iii) constructed social realities tending to confirm the "iorth" of the research
paradign
5. A scholarly conunity (ro)rroducing and sharing nost of 1-4 above, tending also to
be heuristically or theoretically monopolistic vithin itself, but possihly nultiatic
and substructured
A. Its external research situation
a) forgotten or unapprehended research-relevant experience
b) knowledge interests innanent in the research context: prediction and control,
interpretation (including cosmology development), emancipation (including related
existential engagements) interests as they affect motives and practices
e) research paradims either subsuning the present activities, overlanning Idth or
externally competitive to then
d) associated sponsornhir/application cont.exts, at least tolerant of netascientific
elements, illing to insulate daV to 1av scientific activity, and supportive
towards both research and literature cumulation
*ncevised fron !. r,. Aloer, Jr., "Pron Information Processing to the Pcicnces of Phunan
ronnuniction," forthcoming.
V. Summary and Conclusions
One can summarize the above debates either by highlighting essential
differences in viewpoints, or by trying to synthesize in a compatible
fashion the best arguments of both sides, the hidden unities of these
debates. Tables 1 and 2, respectively, take each approach. In conclu-
sion I hazard one further comment about the relation between social
science epistemologies and political legitimation.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Table 1 shows a remarkable comparability of views, once the effort
has been made to track down corresponding views. The categories on which
contrasts are drawn range from metaphysical views through conceptions
of social science, the role of mathematics and logic, the quality of
cumulative knowledge advance, and the relationship between scholars and
their desciplinary and sociopolitical environments. One should note
the extent to which Popper and Lakatos falsificationism, the Kuhn and
Feyeraband positions are intermediate between the extreme positions
in the Table.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Relying heavily upon Lakatos, Kuhn and Masterman, supplemented by
Habermas' important contributions on the role of the context of social
research, Table 2 attempts a schematic synthesis of the research program,
paradigm exemplar and disciplinary matrix ideas. The categories in the
table elaborate upon those in Table 1. The contents correspond to
incompletely articulated standards for judging the progressivity of
scientific research. Philosophical issues are emphasized, but placed
in the socio-historical context of the research in question. I hope
this schema which requires and invites additional discussion, will be
a contribution to further discussions of social scientific progress.
I have paid particular attention to the kinds of logics most appropriate to
scientific political inquiry. In doing so, I have noted a number of formal revisions
or extensions of the positivistic PM system that are at least partly relevant for "prac-
tical," "reflective" or dialogical purposes. But the issues are deeper. Scientific
debate and knowledge cumulation is an ideal form of social practice for all-modern/mod-
ernizing states. Whether such progress is best governed by positivistic logical
"puritanism" the incremental development of internally or externally imposed dogmas,
a liberal, open society full of contenders seeking discovery priority rights (Nobel
prizes), revolutionary anarchism, dialectical hermeneutics or the liberal communism
of scientific knowledge production (Bernal) makes a political difference. Does not
the legitimacy of modern states depend in part on how successfully they accommodate
their decision-making practice to some "scientific" ideal?
NOTES
1. Although the footnotes of this paper are a beginning, I cannot pretend
to give all relevant citations on this subject generally or the more special-
ized discussion of dialectical logic. The articles in the Poznan Studies
in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities special issue on the
categorical Interpretation of Dialectics are, collectively, one specially
relevant source; they tend to reformulate dialectical ideas in standard
logic, as does Jon Elster (using modal operations) in Logic and Society:
Contradiction and Possible Worlds, Wiley and Sons, New York, 1978. Nicholas
Rescher, Dialectics, State University of New York at Albany Press, Albany,
1978, introduces a new set of open-ended logical formalizers derived from
Greco-Roman traditions of classical debate. His bibliography too is of
help. And one should consult English sources like William Kneale and
Martin Kneale, The Development of Logic, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978
(a standard account of the transformation of logic in the Anglo-Saxon
world from Greek dialectics to post-Fregian extensional formalism) or
Susan Haack's partly relevant Deviant Logic, Cambridge University Press,
London, 1974.
Three additional Marxist sources deserving attention are Henri Lefebvre,
Logique Formelle Logique Dialectique, Editions Anthropos, Paris, 1969;
P.V. Kopnin, Logica Dialectica, Editorial Grijalbo, S.A., Mexico, D.F.,
1966; and E. V. Ilyenkov, Dialectical Logic, Progress Publishers, Moscow,
1977.
2. A face to face debate on the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science,
Vol. 2, No. 2, Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962 and 1970, took place at the International
Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science held at Bedford College, Regent's
Park, London 11-17 July 1965. Papers derived from this discussion appear in
I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge,
Cambridge University Press, London and New York, 1970. Due to Lakatos' death,
the latest major contributions to the original debate are Paul Feyerabend,
Against Method: outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge, New Left Books,
London,.1975; Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge: an Evolutionary Approach,
Oxford University Press, 1972; S. Toulmin, Human Understanding (Princeton Univ-
ersity Press, Princeton, 1972). See also T.S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension:
Selected Studies in Scientific Traditon and Change, University et Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1977.
3, The degree of misunderstanding characterizing the debates between Popper
and Kuhn, their critics and defenders is perhaps even exceeded in the Popper-
Adorno controversy reflected in T. Adorno et al, Der Positivismusstreit in der
deutschen Soziologie, Neuwied, Luchterhand, 1969, reprinted in revised form as
The Positivism Dispute in German Sociology, translated by G. Adey and D. Frisby,
Harper Torch books, New York, 1976.
4, G. Radnitzky, Contemporary Schools of Metascience, University Books,
Goteborg, 1968 and 1970 (available in the United States in an augmented
and revised third edition, 3 vols. in one, Henry Regnery, Chicago, 1973).
The author does a better job in clarifying and integrating the continental
"hermeneutic-dialectic" tradition with Anglo-Saxon "logical empiricism,"
using a rather Popperian "systems-theoretically oriented approach to meta-
science with practical intent." (p. xii)
R. Bernstein's The Restructuring of Political and Social Theory,
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, New York and London, 1976, is remarkably
similar in thematic coverage to Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological
Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociology, Hutchinson of
London and Basic Books of New York, 1976.
5. I am departing from Radnitzky's text here not because of the importance of
extensionality, which he rightly emphasizes, but because of his definition of
it in terms of the Whitehead-Russell logical calculus (called PM), rather than
in terms of the ideals that Whitehead-Russell and other mathematical logicians
have sought, and more or less realized, in their formal linguistic constructions.
My references are to: A.N. Whitehead and B. Russell, Principia Mathematica to *56
Cambridge University Press, N.Y., 1973, pgff, xvff, 20ff, 72ff, p187, p201 and
Appendix C, generalizing somewhat the notion of a "truth-function" (whose truth
or falseness depends only on the truth or falseness of its arguments), Whitehead
and Russell said that "A function of a [propositional] function is called exten-
sional when its truth-value with any argument is the same as. with any formally
equivalent argument" (p72); otherwise it is considered intensional.
Atomic propositions in PM are monadic predicates like R1 (x), or intensional
relations of a multiadic sort (xR2y, etc). "Logic is helpless with atomic proposi-
tions, because their truth or falsehood can only be known empirically." (pxviif).
"[E]very other true proposition can theoretically be deduced by logical "methods"
from the knowledge of all true propositions. (pxv). While mathematical logic
"requires" extensions, "philosophic logic" supplies only intensions. PM's theory
of calsses "reconciles these two apparently opposite facts, by showing that an
extension (which is the same as a class) is an incomplete symbol, whose use always
acquires its meaning through a reference to intension." (p72)
6. Radnitzky then goes on to suggest that this extremely crucial principle of
extensionality leads to preoccupations in the logical empiricist program with
problems of formally representing causal relations in some augmented version of
PM (causal modelling?) The intensionalist character of ordinary discourse also
required reformulation. It should be noted that the logical opaqueness to content
and context of ordinary language is a crucial logical argument against abstract
formal modelling made by ethnomethodologists and "dia-logic" critics of positi-
vistic formalisms. N. Rescher, Dialectics, helps overcome these objections
in his new formalization of the logics of debate.
7. Those readers who would like to check the validity of the above summary charac-
terizations will have to go back to the sources I cite (and their sources). A
good partial check would be to see how many of the variants of logical positivism
described by A. J. Ayer (ed.) Logical Positivism, New York, 1969, differ from or
fit into the "logical empiricist" position -hose summary characterization, slightly
modified, I have taken from Radnitzky. "Analytical philosophy" up until about 1945
would also fit fairly well here. Radnitzky is correct, I think, in separating
"logical empiricism" and its "reconstructionists" from ordinary-language phili-
sophy, pragmatic philosophy, and Popperian "critical rationalism" or Lakatos'
"sophisticated methodological falsificationism" as recipes for scientific
progress.
8. K. 1 . Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. I (Plato) and
Vol. II (Hegel and Marx), Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1945 through 1962.
9. Some will recognize Milton Friedman's"Essay on the Methodology of Positive
Economics," (in his Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago, 1953) to be "Popper-
with-a-twist applied to economics...The idea that unrealistic 'assumptions' are
nothing to worry about, provided that the theory deduced from them culminates in
falsifiable predictions, carried conviction to economists long inclined by habit
and tradition to take a purely instrumentalist view of their subject." Mark Blaug,
"Kuhn versus Lakatos, or paradigms versus research programs in the history of
economics," History of Political Economy, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1975), pp. 399-433, at p.
399. Blaug's paper is a very clear and helpful (but incomplete) discussion of the
Popper-Kuhn-Lakatos debate, and it makes most suggestive applications of Lakatos'
position to economics. Among political scientists Gabriel Almond has particularly
emphasized Popperian views.
10. W.V,O, Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," From a Logical Point of View, 2nd
edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1961, pp. 20-46 at p. 22. It is
worth noting that Quine, a logician deeply sympathetic with the Russellian pro-
gram, had before 1960 rejected as dogmatic two of the core principles of logical
empiricism given above: "One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between
truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of
fact, and truths which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is
reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some
logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience." Although Popper
resoundingly rejects the second belief, he apparently still adheres to the "ana-
lytical" half of the first; nonetheless there is a certain conflicted tendency in
his thought to move in the same direction as Quine: "One effect of abandoning
[these two dogmas] is...a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative
metaphysics and natural science. Another effect is a shift toward pragmatism."
(Quine, Ibid., p. 20.) Lakatos, op. cit., p. 119, note 5 and p. 184, infers the
same tendencies in some of Popper's more sophisticated distinctions.
11. The issue of the appropriate meaning of "rationality" will come up below in
contrast between naturalistic and hermeneutic or dialectical conceptions of
social science.
It might also be noted that any contemporary appeal to standard "deductive
logic" needs further specification concerning the extent to which it is entirely
"extensional" or "truth-functional" in the Whitehead-Russell sense. G.E. Moore
long ago showed that allowing a logical connective "is entailed by", or "follows
from the meaning of" (not the "if... then" horseshoe of PM) enables
one formally to represent intensionalist internal relations of the sort Hegelians
are typically concerned with. (Moore, 1921). Elster (1977) gives a related treat-
ment. A supreme logical positivist, Carnap, supplements PM with a special modal
predicate 'N" ("it is'necessary that") in order to characterize derivations appro-
priate to "analytical" or "intensionalist" inferences from the "meanings" of terms.
G.H. vonWright in Explanation and Understanding (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,
1971, pp. 40ff) makes a strong case that "causality" is a modal concept requiring
intensionalist interpretation, perhaps one reason why Russell, according 4', does
not treat physcal laws as causal. Modern philosophical psychologists have, more-
over, greatly expanded the intensionalist examples of PM (e.g. A believes p),
referring to the "opacity" of such contexts.
*1,.
12Blaugh gives several nice examples of Lakatosian research programs, one of which
we include for concreteness at this point, his (incomplete) description of the
"neoclassical research programme in business behavior" derived from Latsis. The
hard core is made up of "(1) profit-maximization, (2) perfect knowledge,
(3) independence of decisions, and (4) perfect markets". Positive heuristics
include "the analysis of equilibrium conditions as well as comparative statics."
The protective belt includes several auxiliary assumptions: "(1) product homo-
geneity, (2) large numbers, and (3) free entry and exit." (Blaug, op. cit.,
p. 419, citing S. J. Latsis, "Situational Determinism in Economics," British
Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 23 (1972): 209, 212.
A superb discussion of the role of construct paradigms or partly tacit exemplars
that account for the relatively "unproblematic conduct" of disciplined social
science research is Sheldon White's unpublished "The Dialectic of Method and Theory
in the Work of Psychology."
Briefly White's argument is this. Knowledge grpws out of the applications of
procedures. Paradigm communities can be identified in terms of "social proof
structures," subdisciplinary "games" that are collections of procedures and associated
partially tacit knowledge which standardize interactions with the world and allow.
agreements on reproducible patterns of experience noteworthy as "events". Some
methodologically self-conscious procedures also exist within the social proof struc-
ture for distentangling replicable "factual" pattras from "artifactual" patterns
seen as reflecting properties of such games. And there are procedures for mapping
the "out there" patterns to constitute theories.
Comparing learning theory and psychoanalysis, there has been a clear tradeoff
between parsimony replicable procedures and reproducible facts on the one hand and
plausible consistency in the mapping of a much-richer universe of phenomena on
the other. Learning theory was slowed down in its progress because of the implaus-
ibility of its partial results, findings which nonetheless virtually forced it to
abandon its behavioristic pre-theory; a dialectical consequence
of behavioristic empiricism, however, was the gradual development of instrumental
capabilities permitting the growth of empirically controlled cognitive learning
research. Psychoanalysis has seen less empirical development since Freud, White
argues, but it has benefitted from a "between-paradigm dialectic" that allows
significant, if partial cross-mappings from information-processing, ethnological,
genetic epistemological, mental testing and neuro-psychological traditions.
Myjaccount follows Blaug, op. cit. p4 08, who cites I. Lakatos, "History of
Science and Its Rational Reconstruction" in R. S. Cohen and C. R. Buck (eds.),
Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, VIII (1971) at p91f.
Jurgen Habermas, "The Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," pp131-
162 in Adorno et al, op. cIt. at p112. Tiabermes, like Adorno uses "positiviam'
as an epithet, but is more careful at most points to clarify what he means. The
affinities of Popper with early Wittgenstein, Weber and Nagel appear to be what
he has in mind as "analytical" or "analytical-empirical" philosophy.
In addition to previous cited sources the most impressive review of "Dialectical
Logic Today" I have found is by Paul Piccone, Telos 1 (no. 2, 1968): 38-83. It
* connects Hegelian and Marxian roots of the subject to recent philosophical thinking
in the United States, plus Eastern and Western Europe.
Clark Butler, in "The Reducibility of Hegelian to Standard Logic," The Personalist,
1975, reviews three schools of thought regarding the formalization of dialectics: anti-
formalist, presumably like Adorno and Habermas opposed to formalization; hyper-
formalists arguing that a whole new kind of logic (typically 3-valued and self-
referential) is needed; Butler advocates an extended standard approach allowing
intensional meanings (as did Leibniz) and quantification over a universe of pre-
dicate relationships, not just sets of objects to which propositions might truth-
fully refer.
The text above, by making specific reference to linguistic reflexivity also
raises the issue of self-referential logics, overzealously forbidden by Whitehead
and Russell's theory of types in PM in order to avoid a whole class of self-
referential paradoxes such as the Cretan Parmenidies' ambiguous assertion that "all
Cretans are liars." As with other areas of logical development considerable technical
progress has been made with the problem of non-contradictory self-referring predicates
(see Varela's "A Calculus for Self-Reference," International Journal of General
Systems, 2 (1975, pp. 5-24), V. Lefevbre, The Structure of Awareness, Soge,
1977, and B.L. Alperson's"Calculus of Interpersonal Phenomenology," Behavioral
Science, 1975.
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